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STATEMENT OF THE CASF 
Nature Of The Case 
Wayne Simpson appeals from 
sexual penetration. 
judgment of 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
forcible 
Simpson confessed to physically and sexually abusing a two-year-old 
child living in the home where he was staying. (PSI, pp. 4-5; R., pp. 12-13, 15-
16, 20-23, 27-28, 30-33.) The state charged him with injury to a child and 
forcible sexual penetration. (Augmentation.) 
Simpson filed a motion to suppress (R., pp. 84-90), which the state 
opposed (R., pp. 94-100). After a hearing (4/16/14 Tr.), the district court denied 
the motion (R., pp. 111-18). The district court found the facts as follows: 
Based on trauma to a child's body that was discovered by hospital 
personnel, law enforcement concluded that the child had been 
sexually abused sometime between February 18, 2013, and 
February 23, 2013. In the months between February, 2013 and 
June 28, 2013, law enforcement contacted Defendant and 
questioned him about the abuse multiple times. During each 
interview, Defendant denied any culpability. 
On June 28, 2013, Officer Jessica Marely [sic] ("Officer Marley") 
contacted Defendant at his home. She told Defendant that 
Detective Lawrence of the Idaho Falls Police Department wanted to 
speak with him about the abuse at the Law Enforcement Building. 
While at his home, Defendant asked Officer Marley if he was going 
to be arrested. Officer Marley replied that law enforcement had 
some questions and that Defendant would not be arrested that day. 
Officer Marley then transported Defendant to the Law Enforcement 
Building. 
Prior to becoming a police officer, Officer Marley worked as an 
investigator for the Department of Health and Welfare, where she 
investigated child abuse cases for Child Protective Services. In her 
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work as a child welfare investigator, Officer Marley investigated 
sexual abuse in Defendant's family. Officer Marley testified that she 
had significant contact with Defendant over the years and had 
knowledge of sexual abuse in Defendant's family. During the June 
28, 2013, interview, Defendant was twenty-nine-years-old. 
However, at the time of Officer Marely's initial contact with 
Defendant, he was approximately twelve-years-old. Officer Marley 
also testified that she had personally contacted Defendant in a law 
enforcement capacity on multiple unrelated occasions. 
When Officer Marley and Defendant arrived at the Law 
Enforcement Building, Detective Lawrence took Defendant to a 
small, windowless room ("interrogation room") for questioning. 
Before beginning the questioning, Detective Lawrence informed 
Defendant that he was not under arrest, would not be arrested, and 
was free to leave. Defendant's response was inaudible, but 
Detective Lawrence responded to Defendant with "Okay." The 
officers testified that they never read Defendant his Miranda rights, 
Defendant did not appear confused and tracked the conversation 
throughout the interrogation, and that Defendant was never told he 
could not leave. 
Detective Lawrence then began questioning Defendant about his 
involvement with the child's injuries. Defendant offered an 
explanations [sic] for the child's injuries, but did not admit 
culpability. After several minutes of questioning, Officer Marley took 
over the questioning. Officer Marley told Defendant that she had 
been involved with the investigation of his family several years ago 
and that she placed Defendant in foster care. She told Defendant 
that she knew his family's bad circumstances. Defendant said that 
he had forgotten, but that the case involved his little sister and 
niece. Officer Marley mentioned that she knew bad things 
happened to Defendant personally. Defendant responded that he 
knew that people in his family had been raped. Throughout this 
portion of the questioning, Officer Marley consistently referenced 
Defendant's history of abuse. 
After several minutes of questioning, all parties took a brief break 
from the questioning. During the break, Officer Marley 
accompanied Defendant outside so he could smoke a cigarette. 
After the break, Detective Lawrence aggressively questioned 
Defendant. The questioning used the techniques of isolation, 
statements that law enforcement knew of Defendant's guilt, 
minimization, and references to the embarrassment of a trial. 
Officer Marley also used her particularized knowledge of 
Defendant's past by vaguely referencing the bad things that 
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happened in Defendant's family. Defendant initially denied 
culpability, but his explanations were inconsistent. Defendant 
denied any involvement, but then admitting [sic] to penetrating the 
child's anus with his fingers. Because of the high level of trauma to 
the child, Officer Marley did not believe Defendant used his fingers. 
An hour to an hour and a half after the interview initially began, 
Defendant admitted to using a vibrator to penetrate the child's 
anus. 
(R., pp. 111-13.) Applying the relevant legal standards, the district court 
concluded that although there were elements of coercion (as there are in every 
police interrogation), such was not sufficient to overcome Simpson's will. (R., pp. 
113-17.) 
After the district court denied Simpson's motion to suppress, Simpson pied 
guilty to forcible sexual penetration, preserving his right to appeal the denial of 
his suppression motion, and the state dismissed the other count. (R., pp. 120-
25.) The district court subsequently imposed a sentence of 25 years with eight 
years determinate. (R., pp. 137-42.) Simpson filed a notice of appeal timely 
from entry of judgment. (R. p. 149.) 
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ISSUE 
Simpson states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether district court erred in denying Mr. Simpson's motion to 
suppress the coerced-compliant statement the officers extracted 
from him after overbearing his will. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Simpson failed to show clear error in the district court's factual 
findings or error in its application of the law to the facts it found? 
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ARGUMENT 
Simpson Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual Findings 
Or Error In Its Application Of The Law To The Facts It Found 
Introduction 
The district court applied the correct legal standard to the facts case 
and concluded that Simpson's confession was not coerced. (R., pp. 111-18.) 
Simpson asserts the district court made clearly erroneous factual findings, which 
ultimately led to an erroneous determination that his confession was not coerced. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-35.) For example, Simpson claims the district court 
erred factually "because it misconstrued Dr. Lindsey's testimony and his 
evaluation, and thus, the nature of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues" and 
"refused to consider the factor that Mr. Simpson was not informed" of his Miranda 
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-21.) Review shows that the district court's 
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and thus Simpson's claim 
of clear error fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review, the appellate court gives "deference to the lower court's 
findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages in "free review 
over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally sufficient to show 
voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 
1995). The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal question freely 
reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). 
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The District Court's Factual Findings Are Supported By The Evidence 
use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession obtained by 
physical or ,..,.,,,, ... +,,, forbidden the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561 
obtained after holding defendant incommunicado for three days and then telling 
him that a lynch mob was on its way was coerced). The test is "whether a 
defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a 
confession," considering "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both 
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (internal quotes omitted). 
This test, however, "is not concerned with moral and psychological 
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion." 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985). Thus, "coercive police activity is 
a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). '"Indeed, far from being prohibited by the 
Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently 
desirable.... Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions.'" 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 
(1977)). 
Examples of mentally coercive police action that have overborne the will of 
a suspect include threats of retaliation for not cooperating, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 
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U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (threats to take children from mother and to deny state 
welfare benefits unless she cooperated were coercive), and certain promises in 
the confession, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991) 
(promise by government agent to protect inmate from fellow if 
confessed coerced confession). Police conduct designed to elicit incriminating 
statements that does not amount to coercion includes misrepresentations about 
the evidence against the defendant, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (false 
representation that co-defendant had confessed and implicated defendant 
"insufficient" to render confession inadmissible), "[pJloys to mislead a suspect or 
lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or 
coercion to speak," Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990), and general 
statements that cooperation with the police will be to the suspect's advantage, 
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). In sum: "Trickery, deceit, even 
impersonation do not render a confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial 
situations and usually in custodial ones as well, unless the government makes 
threats or promises." United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 
2004) (en bane) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
The district court applied the totality of the circumstances test, looking 
specifically at the facts that officers did not provide Miranda warnings; officers 
were not legally required to give Miranda warnings; the interview was non-
custodial and officers told Simpson he was free to leave; Simpson was 29 years 
old; "Dr. Lindsey testified that Defendant may suffer from a mild to moderate form 
of executive function disorder" but also testified that "he never tested Defendant"; 
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Simpson was "tracking and aware" during the interview; questioning lasted "less 
an hour and a half' before Simpson confessed; Simpson was not deprived 
necessities as , water or sleep; Simpson was given a smoking break 
during the interview; Simpson was not arrested. , pp. 11 
court reasoned that although the police used interview techniques that were 
"somewhat coercive," all police interviews and "virtually any contact with law 
enforcement" is inherently coercive, and such alone does not render confessions 
involuntary. (R., pp. 116-17.) Because the district court properly applied the 
totality of the circumstances test to the facts, it properly found that Simpson's 
statements were not compelled. 
In attacking the district court's analysis, Simpson makes several 
misstatements of the law and the facts. For example, he claims that the 
"Supreme Court's concerns with police coercion in custodial interrogations are 
equally applicable in the noncustodial interview." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) 
This claim cannot be squared with the repeated statements by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that custodial interrogation carries such "inherently 
compelling pressures" that that Court has "adopted a set of prophylactic 
measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination." J.D.B. v. North Carolina, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401 
(2011) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Indeed, the "premise of 
Miranda" is that the "danger of coercion" arising from "the interaction of custody 
and official interrogation" requires warnings and a waiver of rights, but Miranda is 
not concerned with "(p]loys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of 
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security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion." Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990). The district court's reasoning, as opposed to 
appellate argument, is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's 
analysis that "[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a 
have coercive aspects to it," but custody equivalent to arrest creates a more 
coercive environment that must be countered by informing the suspect of his 
rights. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977). 
Another misstatement comes when Simpson claims that the "district court 
did not consider Mr. Simpson's mental health issues in its analysis of this issue 
because it believed the officers' testimony that Mr. Simpson appeared to be 
tracking their questions during the interview." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) Here is 
the district court's analysis of Simpson's mental health issues and whether he 
was tracking the questions he was being asked: 
During this contact, Defendant was never read his Miranda rights. 
While this Court understands that this could be a negative factor, 
Miranda did not apply because this was not a custodial 
interrogation. The evidence was clear that Defendant agreed to a 
voluntary interview and was free to leave at any time. Defendant 
was also twenty-nine-years-old at the time of the interview. While 
Dr. Lindsey testified that Defendant may suffer from a mild to 
moderate form of executive function disorder, Dr. Lindsey testified 
that he never tested Defendant. Both officers also testified that 
Defendant appeared to be tracking and aware during the interview. 
Before confessing, Defendant was questioned for less than an hour 
and a half. Defendant was never deprived of any physical 
necessities, such as food, water or sleep. Instead, the officers gave 
Defendant a break partway through the interrogation. While the 
officers questioned Defendant multiple times prior to this encounter, 
he had never been arrested for this crime and was informed that he 
was free to leave. When viewed together, these factors do not 
convince this Court that Defendant's confession was involuntary. 
(R., p. 116.) 
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Lindsey testified that Defendant experienced difficulty tracking 
conversations, but both officers testified that Defendant was abie to 
track during the interrogation. After reviewing the video, this Court 
believes the officers' testimony that Defendant was able to track 
during the interrogation. Based on this evidence, this Court believes 
that the nature of questioning impermissibly confuse, trick, 
or deceive Defendant. 
(R., p. 117.) The district court's stated analysis shows that it did consider Dr. 
Lindsey's testimony about Simpson's mental health issues, but ultimately 
rejected the argument that police exploited those issues to overbear his will and 
coerce a statement. That the district court reached a different conclusion than 
desired by Simpson, based on conflicting evidence, does not show that the court 
ignored the evidence. Simpson's reading of the record is misleading and 
inaccurate. 
A third misstatement is Simpson's claim that the "district court refused to 
consider the factor that Mr. Simpson was not informed of his right to remain silent 
and his right to have an attorney present as discussed in Miranda based on its 
conclusion that Miranda was irrelevant in this case as it was not a custodial 
interrogation." (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) The district court's analysis of this factor 
was as follows: 
During this contact Defendant was never read his Miranda rights. 
While this Court understands that this could be a negative factor, 
Miranda did not apply because this was not a custodial 
interrogation. The evidence was clear that Defendant agreed to a 
voluntary interview and was free to leave at any time. 
(R., p. 116.) The district court thus considered the fact that Miranda warnings 
were not given, but found this was significantly mitigated by the fact that this was 
a non-custodial interrogation, and therefore (as stated above) did not carry the 
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inherent coerciveness that Miranda was designed to ameliorate. Simpson's 
claim the district court "refused to consider" the absence of Miranda warnings in 
totality the circumstances or thought it was "irrelevant" is contrary to the 
district court's stated analysis. 
To make his legal argument Simpson relies heavily on the analysis in 
State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999). (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16, 
23-24, 32.) Although there are some factors in that case similar to this one, there 
are many more that are dissimilar, as shown in the following chart: 
Rettenberger ( citations to pages in 984 Simpson ( citations to pages in record) 
P.2d) 
18 years old (p. 1011) 29 years old (p. 116) 
Was told several times was facing the Was not threatened with the death 
death penalty and that lesser charges penalty. 
might result from cooperation (p. 1012-
13, 1017-18) 
Refused requested contacts with No record of requests to contact 
mother (p. 1012) others. 
Lied "numerous times concerning the No finding that officers lied about 
existence, nature, and strength of evidence (p. 113 (finding "techniques of 
evidence they had collected against isolation, statements that law 
him" (pp. 1012, 1015) enforcement knew of Defendant's guilt, 
minimization, and references to the 
embarrassment of a trial") 
Provided Miranda warnings, but Not provided Miranda warnings (p. 
comments about being represented 116) 
'ignored (p. 1011) 
In jail and kept in solitary confinement Not in jail and told he could leave (R., 
without a pillow or blanket (pp. 1011, p. 113) 
1018) 
Interviewed twice in two days, over Interviewed several times over period 
hours, while in custody (pp. 1011-12) of months, relevant interview about an 
hour to an hour and one-half in length 
(p.113) 
Denied bathroom breaks (p. 1012) Provided a break to smoke (p. 113) 
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I Diagnosed with A.D.D., below average ! I , maturity of 15-year-old, and 
I "symptoms of depression, anxiety 
disorder, thought disorder, 
schizophrenia, and Dependent 
Personality Disorder" (p. 1012) 
Extensive use of "false friend" 
technique, to point Rettenberger stated 
his belief that police were "trying to 
help" him (pp. 1016-17) 
Evaluated with, but not tested for, "mild 
to moderate executive dysfunction," 
"lack of sophisticated thinking," and 
processing information "slowly" (p. 113) 
Limited, if any, use of "false friend" 
technique (p. 117 (finding Officer 
Marley's references to when she was a 
Health and Welfare worker on 
Simpson's case years before "not 
detailed" and "confined to vague 
references of abuse") 
Because of its egregious facts, the Rettenberger case is often distinguished. 
See, §UL, State v. Bunting, 51 P.3d 37 (Utah App., 2002) (misrepresentations of 
evidence, use of "false friend" technique, and other interrogations tactics did not 
rise to the level employed in Rettenberger). Although there are a few passing 
factual similarities, Rettenberger ultimately provides very limited, if any, support 
for Simpson's argument because of its many factual differences. 
Finally, rather than rely on the factual findings made by the district court, 
Simpson invites this Court to apply the law to the conclusions of his experts. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19 (applying legal analysis to testimony of Dr. Lindsey1), 
pp. 21-34 (applying legal analysis to conclusions of Dr. Honts).) Whether to 
accept the conclusions of experts, and what weight to give them, are matters of 
discretion by the trial court, reversible only if the district court acted arbitrarily. 
1 Simpson also requests this Court to consider the PSE and PSI. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 17.) Because neither the PSI nor PSE were presented in support of the 
motion to suppress, they cannot be considered in relation to this issue. See 
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007) (appellate 
review limited to evidence presented). 
12 
Christensen v. Nelson, 125 Idaho 663, 666, 873 P.2d 917, 920 (Ct. App. 1994). 
also Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho 787, 790, 25 P.3d 100, 103 (2001). 
district acknowledged the testimony of the defense experts, including 
noting that Dr. Lindsey "was emphatic that his diagnosis was clinical and 
based on testing" and that Dr. Honts overwhelmingly testified for criminal 
defendants. (R., pp. 1113-14.) Despite this testimony, the district court 
concluded the police did not "impermissibly confuse, trick, or deceive" Simpson, 
and that the evidence overall showed that the confession was voluntary. (R., p. 
117.) 
The district court's findings of fact are based on the evidence. Its analysis 
utilizes the correct legal standards. Simpson's arguments frequently misstate the 
district court's analysis or law, or seek to improperly substitute the district court's 
findings with his experts' analysis. Simpson has therefore failed to show error in 
the district court's order denying his suppression motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the lower court's 
judgment. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2015. 
~\ 
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